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Sir,
We read with great interest Dr McEvoy’s comments on our
paper. His attempt to ‘give a simplified explanation of the
underlying concepts to a non-mathematical physician’ resulted
in an over-simplification, which we would like to clarify from
the start. Strictly speaking, our manuscript discusses multiple
myeloma (MM) as an ‘evolutionary game’ between three interact-
ing cell types, which are viewed as different strategies of a cell
population. In reducing the interplay of cell lineages to hawks and
doves, in whatever variant of the game, Dr McEvoy is pictorially
moving along the edges of the simplex (triangles) in Figures 2–4,
which, in our view, is too much of a simplification, given that MM
development proceeds across the simplex, as explicitly shown in
our paper. Nonetheless, along the edges of the triangle, hawks and
doves play a coexistence game, never a prisoner’s dilemma. This is
an important point, as most of the evolutionary thinking in cancer
has been considered as a simplified version of a prisoner’s
dilemma between two cell lineages, something that is explicitly
abandoned in our work.
Whenever reproduction, mutation and selection occur, evolu-
tion is a natural consequence (Cairns, 1975; Tomlinson and
Bodmer, 1999). Viewed in this way, cancer is an evolutionary
process, albeit an undesirable one with respect to the host. Cancer
is clearly a problem of multicellularity and an almost inevitable
outcome if an organism is large enough, as what matters is the
population of cells at risk, assuming that the organism lives long
enough (Lopes et al, 2007). However, evolution is a blind process –
it is not driven by any specific purpose; cells randomly explore the
fitness landscape and the environment selects for the clone with
the higher fitness. Indeed, reproductive fitness can only be defined
in the context of the environment that selects for or against it. We
agree that to date, it has been difficult to experimentally determine
the fitness (or, in our case equivalently, the payoff) of mutant cells
in a given environment, but it is also true that many experi-
mentalists do not think in terms of evolutionary dynamics.
Perhaps one of the benefits of our work is to illustrate the
importance of thinking in dynamic terms to better understand
cancer and how best to treat it. It is often the case that theory
directs experiment – and our work should be considered in this
light. Indeed, we believe it is a matter of time before the ‘real’ values
of the relevant parameters in such a game can be defined. However,
we wish to point out that we mathematically proved that our conclu-
sions hold true for b41a n d / o rdX0. These values are compatible
with the known biology of myeloma and the outcome will not
change because their absolute values will differ from the ones that
we chose to illustrate these dynamics. One of the strengths of
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) is the generality of its conclusions
(Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Furthermore, and in contrast with
most previous work on somatic evolution of cancer, here the fitness
of a given cell depends on the relative number – the frequency – of
cells of that lineage in the population. Again, here the environment
has an important role, which has been often neglected in the past.
As we pointed out explicitly in the paper, the EGT that we used
is mathematically equivalent to the Lotka–Volterra equations
of ecology (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). We trust Dr McEvoy
will agree with us that cancer is clearly an ecological problem,
certainly at a near-microscopic scale – but nonetheless an
ecological problem as such, and ecology makes no use of
rationality. Indeed, one of the central results of EGT is that its
dynamical formulation – as opposed to the static formulation of
Game Theory (GT), which made it so popular in economics and
affects all our policies as we speak – does not rely on any argument
of rationality (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). It is, however, true,
that if a population of irrational cells engaging in some (genetically
determined) strategy (they did not choose) evolves towards an
Evolutionary Stable State (ESS) (if it exists), the final state will
coincide with the strict Nash equilibrium that a pair of rational
payoff maximisers will choose when they interact once according
to a game with the same payoff matrix. Does this make cells rational?
Not at all, and we thank Dr McEvoy’s comment, for it illustrates a
common confusion that extends well beyond medicine.
Cancer cells have a fitness advantage owing to their mutation
profile (Cairns, 1975; Tomlinson and Bodmer, 1999; Beerenwinkel
et al, 2007). In our model, we do not consider additional mutations
that change this profile, as this would mean introducing new
strategies in the cell population. Their fitness, however, does not
result solely from their mutation profile – it is also dependent on
their microenvironment. We purposefully chose MM because its
interactions with osteoclasts and osteoblasts are well defined and
the general response of the three cell populations to the exchange
of cytokines is well accepted. Of course, similar principles can be Published online 17 November 2009
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malignant disorders.
We disagree with Dr McEvoy that ‘any ESS reached by treatment
can only at best achieve an ESS where normal cells coexist with
malignant cells’. In fact, Figure 2b shows precisely that this need
not be the case, although at present the cure scenario, although
possible, is not under our control. Hence, although it may be
difficult to cure a tumour, this depends on where the populations
lie with respect to the saddle point (unstable equilibrium) as
shown in Figure 2b. If therapies can alter the values of the
interacting parameters such that the patient reaches a state to the
left of this equilibrium point, in the absence of further mutations,
natural selection will eliminate the malignant clone, although this
may take time. Therapies that can reduce the fitness of malignant
cells compared with their normal counterparts exist, with imatinib
(and other tyrosine kinase inhibitors, such as dasatinib or
nilotinib) being perhaps the best example. Indeed, we have shown
that this is the reason for its well-known efficacy in chronic
myeloid leukaemia (Dingli et al, 2008). We believe it is only a
matter of time before other tumours can be treated in a similar
manner. Furthermore, reducing the fitness of a cell does not imply
reversing the process of carcinogenesis. For instance, the reversible
nature of imatinib means that, once treatment is stopped, the
disease may relapse. Consequently, imatinib does not eliminate
bcr–abl oncoprotein expression but abrogates its function and
therefore reduces the relative fitness of cancer cells.
As a final remark, we would like to point out that our results
suggest that the path to win the ‘war on cancer’ is perhaps not to
fulfil the goal pictured in the cover of the Economist in September
2008, in which all cancers cells must be targeted for elimination.
Instead, we may look for our allies in the right place and at the right
scale, which, with a small yet intelligent push from our side, may do
the job much better, by taking advantage of the same ruthless
power of evolution that favoured cancer in the start of the process.
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